Tipe Rumah Asri Sentul RumahCantikku.com adalah agen properti yang berkator di KATV Group, Saladin Square B-12, Jl. Margonda Raya No.39, Depok, Jawa Barat. KATV Group adalah group usaha di baah bendera PT Kiprah Tiga Rancang (KITIRAN), dimana core bisnisnya adalah Pengelolaan dan Advertising KATV (Televisi Kabel Kereta Api Eksekutif ), yaitu televisi hiburan bagi penumpang di atas kereta api eksekutif. Selain itu KITIRAN juga bergerak di bidang advertising untuk promosi luar ruang khusus stasiun-stadiuan dan promsoi di dalam kereta eksekutif dan kereta komuter (KRL).
Tipe Rumah Asri Sentul RumahCantikku.com adalah salah satu devisi dari KATV Group untuk yang bergerak di bidang agen properti. Saat ini baru menawarkan properti-properti KATV Group yang ada di beberapa kota untuk dijual. Jadi properti yang ditawarkan adalah milik sendiri. Tipe Rumah Asri Sentul
saco-indonesia.com, Tiga orang yang telah diduga terlibat dalam kasus pembongkaran makam di kampung Cigaten, Pagedangan, Kabupat
saco-indonesia.com, Tiga orang yang telah diduga terlibat dalam kasus pembongkaran makam di kampung Cigaten, Pagedangan, Kabupaten Tangerang, Banten, yakni Sobri (54), Irshad (45) dan Durat alias Bewok (49), kini telah diperiksa polisi sebagai saksi kasus tersebut.
Kapolsek Pedegangan AKP Murodih, juga mengatakan 3 orang tersebut belum memiliki bukti kuat atas dugaan pembongkaran 93 makam. Oleh sebab itu ketiganya kini dibebaskan.
"Hasil penyelidikan kami, 3 pekerja pembongkaran tersebut saat ini telah sebagai saksi dan dibebaskan. Itu karena kita belum kuat bukti untuk dapat ditetapkan sebagai tersangka," ujar Murodih, Kamis (6/1) kemarin .
Dia juga menuturkan, dari hasil laporan ahli waris yang merasa telah dirugikan hanya satu yang keberatan, yakni Saepudi. "Baru itu yang melapor. Itu juga salah satunya belum kuat bukti," ujarnya.
Selain itu, Murodih juga menjelaskan, dari keterangan ketiga saksi, pembongkaran makam telah dilakukan dengan cara mengangkat kain kafan. Sebab, dari keterangan dari masyarakat beredar kabar bahwa jenazah tersebut dibuang ke sungai Cisadane.
"Dari 93 jenazah itu tidak ada yang dibuang. Itu isu yang tidak benar," terang Murodih menegaskan.
Seperti yang telah diketahui, pembongkaran 93 makam Pagedangan telah disetujui oleh 14 ahli waris yakni Ramli, Saripudin, Suprata, Taing, Juned, Roiyah, Mansur, Tahsir, Ajhari, Hasan, Masun, Juriah dan Suhendi. Lalu hanya 1 yang dirugikan dan tidak diberi tahu.
Editor : Dian Sukmawati
Ketua Komisi I DPRD Banten: Tak mau mundur, Atut tak punya moral
Ratu atut Chosiyah sudah hampir dua bulan lamanya mendekam di Rutan Pondok Bambu Jakarta Timur. Hingga kini Atut masih menjabat sebagai gubernur Banten.
Ratu atut Chosiyah sudah hampir dua bulan lamanya mendekam di Rutan Pondok Bambu Jakarta Timur. Hingga kini Atut masih menjabat sebagai gubernur Banten.
Ketua Komisi I DPRD Banten dari Fraksi PDIP Agus Wisass menilai, sikap itu telah menjadi bukti Atut tidak sayang pada masyarakat Banten. Sebab hingga kini Atut tak juga mundur dari posisinya dan memimpin Banten dari balik jeruji.
"Undang-undang No 32 itu memang telah mengatakan sebelum terdakwa dia tidak bisa berhenti, tetapi harus dipahami Undang-undang No 32 itu berazaskan moral dan etika. Moral dan etika itu artinya dikembalikan ke yang bersangkutan masing masing. Yang bersangkutan tidak mempunyai moral dan etika tidak sayang dengan rakyat banten, harusnya legowo mundur," ujar Agus Wisass, Jumat (14/3).
Agus juga meminta anggota DPRD Banten penerima mobil mewah dari adik Atur, Tubagus Chaeri Wardana, mundur dari jabatannya. Sebab, mereka telah mengkhianati amanat rakyat.
Apalagi, kebanyakan dari mereka telah mencalonkan kembali menjadi caleg pada Pemilu 2014 ini.
"Seperti hal sekarang kalau ada caleg terindikasi ya mundur sudahlah ngapain, malu. Di luar sana orang Banten miskin-miskin yang makan saja susah pengangguran saja banyak, kok dia enak-enakan nikmati duit korupsi," katanya.
How Some Men Fake an 80-Hour Workweek, and Why It Matters
Imagine an elite professional services firm with a high-performing, workaholic culture. Everyone is expected to turn on a dime to serve a client, travel at a moment’s notice, and be available pretty much every evening and weekend. It can make for a grueling work life, but at the highest levels of accounting, law, investment banking and consulting firms, it is just the way things are.
Except for one dirty little secret: Some of the people ostensibly turning in those 80- or 90-hour workweeks, particularly men, may just be faking it.
Many of them were, at least, at one elite consulting firm studied by Erin Reid, a professor at Boston University’s Questrom School of Business. It’s impossible to know if what she learned at that unidentified consulting firm applies across the world of work more broadly. But her research, published in the academic journal Organization Science, offers a way to understand how the professional world differs between men and women, and some of the ways a hard-charging culture that emphasizes long hours above all can make some companies worse off.
Ms. Reid interviewed more than 100 people in the American offices of a global consulting firm and had access to performance reviews and internal human resources documents. At the firm there was a strong culture around long hours and responding to clients promptly.
“When the client needs me to be somewhere, I just have to be there,” said one of the consultants Ms. Reid interviewed. “And if you can’t be there, it’s probably because you’ve got another client meeting at the same time. You know it’s tough to say I can’t be there because my son had a Cub Scout meeting.”
Some people fully embraced this culture and put in the long hours, and they tended to be top performers. Others openly pushed back against it, insisting upon lighter and more flexible work hours, or less travel; they were punished in their performance reviews.
The third group is most interesting. Some 31 percent of the men and 11 percent of the women whose records Ms. Reid examined managed to achieve the benefits of a more moderate work schedule without explicitly asking for it.
They made an effort to line up clients who were local, reducing the need for travel. When they skipped work to spend time with their children or spouse, they didn’t call attention to it. One team on which several members had small children agreed among themselves to cover for one another so that everyone could have more flexible hours.
A male junior manager described working to have repeat consulting engagements with a company near enough to his home that he could take care of it with day trips. “I try to head out by 5, get home at 5:30, have dinner, play with my daughter,” he said, adding that he generally kept weekend work down to two hours of catching up on email.
Despite the limited hours, he said: “I know what clients are expecting. So I deliver above that.” He received a high performance review and a promotion.
What is fascinating about the firm Ms. Reid studied is that these people, who in her terminology were “passing” as workaholics, received performance reviews that were as strong as their hyper-ambitious colleagues. For people who were good at faking it, there was no real damage done by their lighter workloads.
It calls to mind the episode of “Seinfeld” in which George Costanza leaves his car in the parking lot at Yankee Stadium, where he works, and gets a promotion because his boss sees the car and thinks he is getting to work earlier and staying later than anyone else. (The strategy goes awry for him, and is not recommended for any aspiring partners in a consulting firm.)
A second finding is that women, particularly those with young children, were much more likely to request greater flexibility through more formal means, such as returning from maternity leave with an explicitly reduced schedule. Men who requested a paternity leave seemed to be punished come review time, and so may have felt more need to take time to spend with their families through those unofficial methods.
The result of this is easy to see: Those specifically requesting a lighter workload, who were disproportionately women, suffered in their performance reviews; those who took a lighter workload more discreetly didn’t suffer. The maxim of “ask forgiveness, not permission” seemed to apply.
It would be dangerous to extrapolate too much from a study at one firm, but Ms. Reid said in an interview that since publishing a summary of her research in Harvard Business Review she has heard from people in a variety of industries describing the same dynamic.
High-octane professional service firms are that way for a reason, and no one would doubt that insane hours and lots of travel can be necessary if you’re a lawyer on the verge of a big trial, an accountant right before tax day or an investment banker advising on a huge merger.
But the fact that the consultants who quietly lightened their workload did just as well in their performance reviews as those who were truly working 80 or more hours a week suggests that in normal times, heavy workloads may be more about signaling devotion to a firm than really being more productive. The person working 80 hours isn’t necessarily serving clients any better than the person working 50.
In other words, maybe the real problem isn’t men faking greater devotion to their jobs. Maybe it’s that too many companies reward the wrong things, favoring the illusion of extraordinary effort over actual productivity.
Ex-C.I.A. Official Rebuts Republican Claims on Benghazi Attack in ‘The Great War of Our Time’
WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.
The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.
But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.
“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.
A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.
In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.
Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.
“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”
He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.
“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.
Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.
Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.
Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.
But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.
The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.
But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.
Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.
“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.
Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.
Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”
Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.
Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.
“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”