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Probolinggo, Saco-Indonesia.com - Setelah pemeriksaan selama lima hari terungkap bahwa tersangka Buasir Nur Khotib alias Kolor Ijo (50) telah mencuri di 43 lokasi berbeda dan di 31 tempat di antaranya, dia memperkosa korban.

Probolinggo, Saco-Indonesia.com - Setelah pemeriksaan selama lima hari terungkap bahwa tersangka Buasir Nur Khotib alias Kolor Ijo (50) telah mencuri di 43 lokasi berbeda dan di 31 tempat di antaranya, dia memperkosa korban.

Dan sejak Rabu (5/2/2014) Buasir dibawa ke Polda Jawa Timur di Surabaya karena kuat dugaan tersangka juga melakukan kejahatan di dua wilayah hukum, Polresta Probolinggo dan Polres Probolinggo.

Kapolresta Probolinggo, AKBP Iwan Setyawan mengatakan, di Polres Kabupaten Probolinggo, mendapat 27 laporan dari para korban. "Aksi tersangka ini memang di dua daerah, Kota dan Kabupaten Probolinggo," kata Iwan, Rabu (5/2/2014) siang.

Pada awalnya, diketahui ada lima lokasi tindak kejahatan pencurian dan perkosaan yang dilakukan tersangka. Namun, setelah ditangkap, ayah tiga anak ini mengaku telah beraksi di 31 lokasi yang berbeda. Bahkan terakhir, tersangka mengaku sudah beraksi di 43 lokasi berbeda.

Kapolresta Iwan menduga, tersangka mengalami kelainan seks. Pihaknya yakin bila masih ada banyak korban, yang belum melapor. Kini, setelah dilakukan pelimpahan kasus, penyidikan terhadap Kolor Ijo akan dilanjutkan oleh Polda Jatim.

Buasir ditangkap Tim Buser Polresta Probolinggo di rumahnya, Desa Poh Sangit Lor, Kecamatan Wonomerto Kabupaten Probolinggo, pada 30 Januari 2014 setelah satu korbannya berhasil mengenali wajah pelaku dari sketsa yang dibuat polisi.

Selama ini, saat beraksi tersangka mengenakan celana pendek dengan ikat kolor berwarna hijau. Setelah masuk rumah korban, pelaku mengambil barang-barang berharga. Sebagian korban perempuan, diperkosa di ladang atau sawah.

Sumber :kompas.com

Editor : Maulana Lee

Bahan Berkualitas Untuk Konveksi Fashion Pusat Konveksi Di Indonesia   Berbagai Jenis Bahan Kaos T-Shirt Sebaga

Bahan Berkualitas Untuk Konveksi Fashion

Pusat Konveksi Di Indonesia

 

Berbagai Jenis Bahan Kaos T-Shirt

Sebagai pusat pembuatan konveksi, kami menyediakan banyak variasi kain yang bisa kami olah menjadi produk konveksi berkualitas. Ada banyak kain yang tersedia di pasaran, namun akan kami uraikan bahan-bahan yang sangat banyak diminati oleh customer kami.

Kain-kain yang kami jelaskan di bawah ini, umumnya digunakan untuk kaos tipe T-shirt (kaos oblong), Untuk kaos tipe polo shirt/ Berkerah biasanya digunakan kain rajutan cotton pique / lacoste. Untuk penjelasan mengenai kain rajutan Sedangkan untuk jenis jaket (jaket, jumper, cardigan, ataupun hoodie) biasanya digunakan bahan fleece. Jika anda mengutamakan kenyamanan ketika pemakaian utamakan memilih bahan yang asli 100% katun.

saco-indonesia.com,

1. KATUN (combed 20s, 24s, 30s)

Bahan katun combed telah terbuat murni 100% dari serat kapas alami. Bahan combed berkarakteristik telah memiliki tekstur yang sangat halus, dingin, nyaman, dan mudah menyerap keringat, sehingga sangat nyaman dan cocok dipakai di Negara tropis seperti Indonesia. Kain Combed telah memiliki serat benang yang lebih halus dan rata sehingga penampilannya akan menjadi lebih halus , rata dan rapih. Ada beberapa jenis kain combed yang ada di pasaran. Hal ini dapat dibedakan berdasarkan jenis benang yang digunakan serta setting gramasinya. Kami juga telah menyediakan 3 varian combed, Ada combed 20s, 24s, 30s. hal yang telah membedakan adalah ketebalan kain combed. Kain 20s telah memiliki ketebalan yang paling tebal, sedangkan combed 30s telah memiliki ketebalan yang paling tipis. Kain Combed 20s juga merupakan kain yang paling banyak dipakai dan menjadi favorit kaos distro karena selain kenyamanan ketika digunakan, harganya juga tidak mahal.


2. CARDET (20s, 30s)

Dibandingkan dengan kain combed , kain cotton cardet telah memiliki serat benang yang kurang halus. Kain cardet juga merupakan kain KW1 nya kain combed sehingga Hasil rajutan dan penampilan bahan kurang halus dan kurang rata. karena harganya yang relatif lebih murah jika dibandingkan dengan cotton combed, bahan cotton cardet sering digunakan untuk kaos-kaos dengan target pasar kelas menengah, misalnya untuk kaos pabrik, seragam buruh, dan juga kaos oblong olahraga.

3. POLYESTER dan PE

Polyester sesuai namanya, juga merupakan bahan serat sintetis yang telah terbuat dari bahan ester (dalam hal ini hasil sampingan minyak buni dan dibuat bahan berupa serat fiberpoly). Dibandingkan katun, kain jenis ini lebih tipis, agak kasar, dan tidak bisa menyerap keringat sehingga sangat panas ketika dipakai.


4. TC (TETERON COTTON)

seiring dengan kemajuan teknologi, terpengaruh juga teknologi pengolahan bahan kain. Banyak bahan kain hasil dari penggabungan katun dan Polyester, salah satunya adalah TC. Jenis bahan ini juga merupakan campuran dari 35% cotton combed dan 65% polyester. TC ini seperti PE, terasas panas ketika memakainya karena kurang bisa menyerap keringat. Namun kelebihannya bahan ini lebih tahan kusut, dan tidak mudah melar meski sudah lama dipakai.


5. VISCOSE

Viscose biasa juga disebut rayon. Sebuah bahan serat sintesa celulosa organic (buatan manusia) yang biasa digunakan sebagai bahan kain. Teksturnya telah memiliki kesamaan dengan tekstur kapas. Viscose biasanya digunakan untuk dapat menambahkan kenyamanan  pada serat sintesis dan juga menambah kecerahan warna. Serat Viscose mempunyai tahanan kelembaban yang lebih tinggi, kecemerlangan warna yang lebih baik dan lebih lembut dibanding kapas. Namun kain ini juga terkesan mewah, sehingga harganya mahal dan jarang tersedia di pasaran.


6. CVC ( COTTON VISCOSE)

Jenis bahan kaos ini adalah campuran dari 55% Cotton Combed dan 45% Viscose. Kelebihan dari bahan ini adalah tingkat shrinkage-nya (susut pola) lebih kecil dari bahan Cotton. Jenis bahan ini juga bersifat menyerap keringat.


7. HYGET

Jenis bahan ini telah terbuat dari plastic dan sangat tipis, oleh karena itu harganya sangat murah. Namun bahan ini, bisa dibilang kurang layak dan nyaman untuk dijadikan kaos. Biasanya pembuatan kaos dengan bahan ini dilakukan jika ingin membuat kaos dengan jumlah massal tetapi dana yang tersedia tidak terlalu banyak. Bahan ini banyak digunakan untuk keperluan kampanye partai


Editor : Dian Sukmawati

At the National Institutes of Health, Dr. Suzman’s signature accomplishment was the central role he played in creating a global network of surveys on aging.

WASHINGTON — The former deputy director of the C.I.A. asserts in a forthcoming book that Republicans, in their eagerness to politicize the killing of the American ambassador to Libya, repeatedly distorted the agency’s analysis of events. But he also argues that the C.I.A. should get out of the business of providing “talking points” for administration officials in national security events that quickly become partisan, as happened after the Benghazi attack in 2012.

The official, Michael J. Morell, dismisses the allegation that the United States military and C.I.A. officers “were ordered to stand down and not come to the rescue of their comrades,” and he says there is “no evidence” to support the charge that “there was a conspiracy between C.I.A. and the White House to spin the Benghazi story in a way that would protect the political interests of the president and Secretary Clinton,” referring to the secretary of state at the time, Hillary Rodham Clinton.

But he also concludes that the White House itself embellished some of the talking points provided by the Central Intelligence Agency and had blocked him from sending an internal study of agency conclusions to Congress.

Photo
 
Michael J. Morell Credit Mark Wilson/Getty Images

“I finally did so without asking,” just before leaving government, he writes, and after the White House released internal emails to a committee investigating the State Department’s handling of the issue.

A lengthy congressional investigation remains underway, one that many Republicans hope to use against Mrs. Clinton in the 2016 election cycle.

In parts of the book, “The Great War of Our Time” (Twelve), Mr. Morell praises his C.I.A. colleagues for many successes in stopping terrorist attacks, but he is surprisingly critical of other C.I.A. failings — and those of the National Security Agency.

Soon after Mr. Morell retired in 2013 after 33 years in the agency, President Obama appointed him to a commission reviewing the actions of the National Security Agency after the disclosures of Edward J. Snowden, a former intelligence contractor who released classified documents about the government’s eavesdropping abilities. Mr. Morell writes that he was surprised by what he found.

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“You would have thought that of all the government entities on the planet, the one least vulnerable to such grand theft would have been the N.S.A.,” he writes. “But it turned out that the N.S.A. had left itself vulnerable.”

He concludes that most Wall Street firms had better cybersecurity than the N.S.A. had when Mr. Snowden swept information from its systems in 2013. While he said he found himself “chagrined by how well the N.S.A. was doing” compared with the C.I.A. in stepping up its collection of data on intelligence targets, he also sensed that the N.S.A., which specializes in electronic spying, was operating without considering the implications of its methods.

“The N.S.A. had largely been collecting information because it could, not necessarily in all cases because it should,” he says.

The book is to be released next week.

Mr. Morell was a career analyst who rose through the ranks of the agency, and he ended up in the No. 2 post. He served as President George W. Bush’s personal intelligence briefer in the first months of his presidency — in those days, he could often be spotted at the Starbucks in Waco, Tex., catching up on his reading — and was with him in the schoolhouse in Florida on the morning of Sept. 11, 2001, when the Bush presidency changed in an instant.

Mr. Morell twice took over as acting C.I.A. director, first when Leon E. Panetta was appointed secretary of defense and then when retired Gen. David H. Petraeus resigned over an extramarital affair with his biographer, a relationship that included his handing her classified notes of his time as America’s best-known military commander.

Mr. Morell says he first learned of the affair from Mr. Petraeus only the night before he resigned, and just as the Benghazi events were turning into a political firestorm. While praising Mr. Petraeus, who had told his deputy “I am very lucky” to run the C.I.A., Mr. Morell writes that “the organization did not feel the same way about him.” The former general “created the impression through the tone of his voice and his body language that he did not want people to disagree with him (which was not true in my own interaction with him),” he says.

But it is his account of the Benghazi attacks — and how the C.I.A. was drawn into the debate over whether the Obama White House deliberately distorted its account of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens — that is bound to attract attention, at least partly because of its relevance to the coming presidential election. The initial assessments that the C.I.A. gave to the White House said demonstrations had preceded the attack. By the time analysts reversed their opinion, Susan E. Rice, now the national security adviser, had made a series of statements on Sunday talk shows describing the initial assessment. The controversy and other comments Ms. Rice made derailed Mr. Obama’s plan to appoint her as secretary of state.

The experience prompted Mr. Morell to write that the C.I.A. should stay out of the business of preparing talking points — especially on issues that are being seized upon for “political purposes.” He is critical of the State Department for not beefing up security in Libya for its diplomats, as the C.I.A., he said, did for its employees.

But he concludes that the assault in which the ambassador was killed took place “with little or no advance planning” and “was not well organized.” He says the attackers “did not appear to be looking for Americans to harm. They appeared intent on looting and conducting some vandalism,” setting fires that killed Mr. Stevens and a security official, Sean Smith.

Mr. Morell paints a picture of an agency that was struggling, largely unsuccessfully, to understand dynamics in the Middle East and North Africa when the Arab Spring broke out in late 2011 in Tunisia. The agency’s analysts failed to see the forces of revolution coming — and then failed again, he writes, when they told Mr. Obama that the uprisings would undercut Al Qaeda by showing there was a democratic pathway to change.

“There is no good explanation for our not being able to see the pressures growing to dangerous levels across the region,” he writes. The agency had again relied too heavily “on a handful of strong leaders in the countries of concern to help us understand what was going on in the Arab street,” he says, and those leaders themselves were clueless.

Moreover, an agency that has always overvalued secretly gathered intelligence and undervalued “open source” material “was not doing enough to mine the wealth of information available through social media,” he writes. “We thought and told policy makers that this outburst of popular revolt would damage Al Qaeda by undermining the group’s narrative,” he writes.

Instead, weak governments in Egypt, and the absence of governance from Libya to Yemen, were “a boon to Islamic extremists across both the Middle East and North Africa.”

Mr. Morell is gentle about most of the politicians he dealt with — he expresses admiration for both Mr. Bush and Mr. Obama, though he accuses former Vice President Dick Cheney of deliberately implying a connection between Al Qaeda and Iraq that the C.I.A. had concluded probably did not exist. But when it comes to the events leading up to the Bush administration’s decision to go to war in Iraq, he is critical of his own agency.

Mr. Morell concludes that the Bush White House did not have to twist intelligence on Saddam Hussein’s alleged effort to rekindle the country’s work on weapons of mass destruction.

“The view that hard-liners in the Bush administration forced the intelligence community into its position on W.M.D. is just flat wrong,” he writes. “No one pushed. The analysts were already there and they had been there for years, long before Bush came to office.”

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